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Abstract
Gauri and Khaleghian use cross-national  social,  political,  bureaucratic  elites have  an affinity for immunization
economic,  and institutional  data to explain why some  programs and are granted more autonomy  in autocracies,
countries have  stronger immunization  programs than  although this  effect is not visible  in  low-income
others, as measured by diptheria-tetanus-pertussis  (DTP)  countries.  The authors also find that the quality of a
and measles vaccine  coverage rates and the adoption of  nation's institutions  and its level  of development are
the hepatitis B vaccine.  After reviewing the existing  strongly  related to immunization  rate coverage  and
literature on  demand- and supply-side factors that affect  vaccine  adoption, and that coverage rates are in general
immunization programs,  the authors find that the  more a function of supply-side than demand  effects.
elements that most affect immunization  programs in low-  There is no evidence  that epidemics or polio eradication
and middle-income countries  involve broad changes in  campaigns  affect immunization  rates one  way or another,
the global policy environment and contact with  or that average immunization  rates increase following
international  agencies. Democracies  tend to have lower  outbreaks of diphtheria, pertussis, or measles.
coverage rates than autocracies,  perhaps because
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Why do some countries consistently immunize children more effectively than
others? Both practical and theoretical concerns motivate  the question. Practically, there is
little systematic  evidence  about what policies and vaccination strategies expand
immunization  coverage.  Understanding the relative importance of campaigns versus routine
programs, the role of international donors, access to health care facilities, the availability of
communication  equipment, and other factors will help health policy planners design
immunization programs. In addition, a number of foundations,  multilateral agencies,
governments, and analysts have come to believe that in developing countries vaccines will
be necessary to halt the spread of devastating diseases, such as HIV/AIDS and malaria,  and
that developing countries and their governments, left to themselves, will not buy enough
vaccines to stimulate market development of vaccines for those diseases.  This paper
examines the question of why some developing country governments do not purchase and
deliver enough vaccines to their populations, and what might be done about this, both for
existing and future vaccines.
The theoretical motivation involves the political sources of social policy.  For some
policy outcomes,  hyper-rational  accounts of government  choices are not tenable,  and
political explanations  are unavoidable.  In the case of vaccines, every society recognizes that
immunization is a task for government,  the materials cost of the basic six childhood
-1I-vaccines is low (less than $1 per filly immunized child), and financial and technical
assistance for vaccination is available from international organizations.  Despite this, many
governments fail to immunize their populations adequately.  Related theoretical problems
appear in other sectors. Many governments  adopt ruinous economic and education policies
despite a mountain of evidence regarding their irrationality.  Generally, analysts explain
these policy outcomes by identifying winners and losers, assessing the political, economic,
and cultural resources available to various interest groups,  and examining patterns of
decisionmaking institutionalized  in customs and laws. This paper uses a panel data set of
immunization  coverage rates and the timing of vaccine adoption in low- and middle-income
countries,  along with a time series of  potential political, economic,  social, and institutional
determinants, to identify the political and organizational  factors associated with strong
immunization programs.
The debate over how countries have improved health outcomes has two main
camps. One camp emphasizes the role of economic growth and related gains in nutrition
(McKeown  1976, Fogel 1984); the other camp, who are writers, point to the importance of
public health measures such as communicable disease control and skilled attendance  at
birth. (Preston 1976). Each group has favored country examples:  for the former the United
States and Britain and Wales, where public health was weak when mortality rates fell
sharply in the nineteenth century,  and for the latter Sri Lanka and the Indian state of Kerala,
where mortality rates fell in this century despite extremely modest gains in national income.
In fact, there is nothing inherently incompatible  about the views espoused by the two
camps. Public health measures reduce the likelihood of individuals being exposed to
pathogens, whereas income and nutrition contribute to their ability to resist or recover from
exposure.  Achieving a life expectancy over 70 probably requires both a minimal income
and nutritional level, as well as a reasonably strong public health system, but at lower life
expectancies  the two factors might function as substitutes. (Johansson and Mosk 1987) The
politics, economics,  and history of any given country might make either the income or the
public health path to low mortality easier to achieve.
This paper contributes to an emergent literature within the public health camp on the
political, economic, and social characteristics of countries that are able to achieve low
mortality despite low levels of income. That discussion focuses on, to put it simply, how
democracy and social mobilization can contribute to the institutionalization of a public
health agenda,  as in Kerala,  Sri Lanka, and Costa Rica, and how hierarchy and
revolutionary ideology can create the same, as in Cuba, Vietnam, and China.
-2-Kerala, Sri Lanka, and Costa Rica are autonomous regions whose  achievements  in
raising life expectancy and lowering infant mortality are widely cited. Those societies share
several characteristics:  small  and densely settled populations,  a relatively high degree of
female autonomy, a respect for education,  and the absence of a rigid class structure. At the
same time, their governments have historically allocated significant resources to the health
care system,  and the political histories of the regions are characterized by egalitarianism
and a national consensus with marked elements of populism that emerged from political
contestation.  (Caldwell  1986) Their histories are consistent with theoretical treatments of
the impact of democracy on social policy: competitive elections motivate politicians to
provide social services to capture the support of the poor, the poor face higher costs in
mobilizing for social  services in authoritarian  governments, and democracies  empower
interest groups and social movements  advocating propoor social policies. (Lake and Baum
2001, McGuire 2001,  Weyland  1996) But Vietnam, China, and Cuba are also countries that
have improved the health of their citizens dramatically despite relatively low levels of
income per capita.  In those countries political contestation played no role, but disciplined
party organizations structured in a quasi-military fashion and social revolutions followed by
high levels of government expenditure on health and social infrastructure  did (Bryant 1998,
Parish and Whyte  1978).  This paper assesses the impact of competitive elections on one
clear and measurable facet of public health outcomes, immunization.
Immunization programs differ in some ways from most other kinds of health care.
Consensus among technical  experts in the field of immunization  is stronger, the time-frame
for policy reforms is shorter (if "reform" is even the right word for increasing coverage
rates or adopting a new vaccine),  household demand for it is weaker than for curative health
care, and the professional and pecuniary interests of the providers  are weaker in companson
to other areas of health reform, such as changes in insurance and provider payment systems.
In addition, multinational pharmaceutical  corporations operating in an oligopolistic market
and the international scientific community have unusually  strong influence on the vaccines
distributed in developing countries.  So the explanation of immunization outcomes in this
paper might not be co-extensive with a broader theoretical account of public health
programs in developing countries.  In particular,  there are reasons to believe that the
political and organizational determinants of immunization programs might depend less for
their effect on the way they either promote or dampen the demands of interest groups and
households,  which is how institutions are understood to operate in most political economy
accounts of social service provision, and more on their direct effect on the actions of
political and bureaucratic  elites.
-3-There has been little work that disaggregates the categories of public health and
examines the political and organizational sources of policies in its subsectors. One
noteworthy exception is an historical treatment by Nathanson (1996),  whose arguments are
suggestive for a comprehensive  account of the political economy of public health, which
will require case studies in addition to cross-national approaches like that taken in this
paper. In the late nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries France enacted
national legislation for the inspection of wet nurses, paid maternity leave, free medical care
during confinement, and obligatory maternity insurance, while the United States lent no
federal attention to maternal and child health until maternal health education programs
began in 1921  (only to be rescinded in 1929).  On the other hand, beginning in 1965  the
United States mandated warnings for tobacco consumers, curtailed tobacco advertising,
banned smoking during interstate transportation,  and raised cigarette excise taxes, which
jointly had the effect of lowering U.S. cigarette consumption sharply; but France has not
reduced cigarette  consumption and has achieved only limited compliance with smoking
bans in public facilities. Nathanson uses two main factors to explain why maternal and
child health concerns appear unrelated to antismoking  efforts in the two countries. First, the
French state is more centralized than the American, so resources for service provision are
more easily mobilized when there is state consensus.  Since improving maternal and child
health requires additional resources, it is not surprising that France has a more active record
than the United States in that area. Centralization also explains French weakness in
antismoking efforts. Alternative  channels for social policy change,  such as local
governments  and social movements, are not available when the French state is divided,
which it happens to be in this area because government-owned  tobacco producers resist
controls.  In a decentralized  country like the United States, alternative government entities,
such as state court and legislatures,  are available when action at the federal level is blocked,
and it is in fact at the state level where the antismoking campaign first gained its
momentum. Nathanson's second explanatory factor is the style of risk construction. United
States social and political  culture tends to construct health risks as dangers to individuals,
whereas the French style of risk constructions  emphasizes threats to the nation.
Consequently, the rights of individual nonsmokers were dispositive for legislative and court
action in the United States, and the language of French nationalism was critical for the
pronatalism that helped to justify maternal  and child health policies in France in the  19th
century.
Prevailing Views on the Determinants of Immunization Coverage
Most studies use household surveys and explain variance in childhood
immunization "uptake" or "demand" with characteristics  of children's mothers and their
-4-households, often but not always including community-level  fixed effects. These studies
invariably find maternal education and household socioeconomic to be correlated with the
probability of childhood immunization, but there are disparate findings concerning the
extent to which these are causally related to immunization status, and whether measurable
maternal  and household characteristics  might be proxies for other underlying factors or for
characteristics  of the communities of residence.
For instance, Desai and Alva (1998) use the first round of data from the
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) in 22 countries and find that whereas the inclusion
of individual-level  and community-level  fixed effects significantly weakens the relationship
between maternal education and childhood health, the link between maternal education and
child immunization remains strong. In a survey in two villages near Yogyakarta,  Indonesia,
Streatfield,  Singarimbun,  and Diamond (1990) also find that immunization status is related
to maternal  education,  albeit in a U-shaped pattern in which illiterate mothers are more
likely to have their children immunized than mothers with a little primary education, but
much less likely than mothers with some secondary schooling.  They explain the U-shaped
pattern by arguing that illiterate mothers  comply more often with social norms, but that
higher levels of education are associated with knowledge of the functions  of the vaccines,
which has a strong and independent effect.  Their multivariate analysis finds that the effect
of formal  education disappears when mothers have correct knowledge  of the functions of
vaccines.  In another study, Gage,  Sommerfelt,  and Piani (1997) find that higher household
socioeconomic  levels and more maternal education both increase the likelihood of
childhood immunization in Nigeria and Niger, and that household structure (living in a
nuclear or elementary polygynous family, as opposed to a laterally extended family)
negatively affects immunization probabilities in Nigeria, but not in Niger. In a study of
family choices for maternal and child health in Guatemala,  Pebley,  Goldman,  and
Rodriguez  (1996) find that both mother's and father's education are significantly and
positively related to childhood immunization status, as is living in urban areas, but that
unobserved  family and community characteristics  are even more influential.  They
hypothesize that family health beliefs, differing abilities among families to take advantage
of available resources,  and variance in the intensity of immunization campaigns  in different
areas might explain these intraclass correlations.  In a study of immunization uptake in four
rural areas of Bangladesh, Steele, Diamond, and Amin (1996) find that the effect of
mother's education on child immunization status disappears once father's education is
included,  and that the latter became insignificant when village-level dummy variables are
added. They find a large amount of unexplained variation at both the household  and village
levels, which they speculate might be related to immunization accessibility,  the attitudes of
local leaders, differences in household attitudes and beliefs, and power relationships within
-5-the household.  Their study offers evidence  for the power relationship  interpretation since
children who lived with their mothers and patemnal grandparents were significantly less
likely to be immunized, and children whose mothers belonged to women's social groups
were significantly more likely to be immunized.
Anthropological  accounts of the demand for or acceptance of immunization center
on the relationship between modem germ theory and local beliefs. For example, villagers in
South Asia have been reluctant to accept vaccines  for smallpox  and measles out of a belief
that a goddess causes those diseases, and that treating a body that she has inhabited will
anger her and only make the disease worse (Caldwell, Reddy, and Caldwell  1983, Nichter
1995). Still others do accept immunization, particularly for smallpox, because they interpret
the vaccination mark as a kind of talisman that can ward off the spirit or the goddess.  The
Sri Lankan Ministry of Health has used this association by placing an amulet on a national
vaccination poster.  The conflation with talismans can be misleading, however, because
these, unlike childhood immunizations,  are believed to reduce the severity of afflictions
without eliminating their occurrence,  and to have a temporary effect.  Other reasons  for
refusing vaccines include the impression that if a vaccinated child is healthy she does not
need any more immunizations,  the idea that a vaccination protects against all illness and the
resulting disappointment if a vaccinated child falls ill, the fear that the side effect from a
given vaccine will also occur following all vaccines,  the fearful association between the
syringe and the Christian cross,  and the impression that immunization is related to
sterilization efforts or medical experimentation (Nichter 1995). These beliefs make clear
how education might work to increase immunization acceptance,  not only by providing
information, endowing the skills to acquire further information, and strengthening the status
of certain household members, but also by creating a sense of identification with the
modernity and its associated schools, clinics, and practices (Caldwell  1983, 1986).
It is important to note that the fear of immunization  is not a monopoly of developing
countries.  Classic accounts include Voltaire's mocking portrayal in 1733 of his own
countrymen for their suspicion of the British use of smallpox vaccination:  "It is
inadvertently affirm'd in the Christian Countries of Europe, that the English are Fools and
Madmen.  Fools, because they give their Children the Small-Pox to prevent their catching it;
and Mad-men, because they wantonly communicate  a certain and dreadful Distemper to
their Children, merely to prevent an uncertain Evil." (Letters concerning the English nation,
1733, "Letter XI on Inoculation").  In his Autobiography, Benjamin Franklin noted, and
regretted,  his own similar estimation of the value of inoculation:  "In 1736 I lost one of  my
sons, a fine boy of four years old, by the small-pox, taken in the common way. I long
regretted bitterly, and still regret that I had not given it to him by inoculation. This I
- 6 -mention for the sake of parents who omit that operation,  on the supposition that they should
never forgive themselves if a child died under it; my example showing that the regret may
be the same either way, and that, therefore, the safer should be chosen."  An influential
pamphlet circulated in Sweden in 1818 argued that vaccination would anger God and make
the disease worse (Skold  1996). A modem form of this argument, in which people fear that
immunization  can damage health by driving a disease underground,  continues to recur in
the United States and elsewhere  (James  1988), as do persisting concerns that vaccines  may
increase the likelihood of diseases such as autism, in spite of considerable  evidence to the
contrary (Taylor  and others 1997).
These fears of immunization have had documented negative effects  on vaccine
coverage rates.  Gangarosa and others  (1998)  reviewed antivaccine movements targeted
against the pertussis vaccine in 12 Western countries and  found a strong correlation
between the timing and strength of the movements and declines in vaccine coverage rates.
For example a 1974 report in the United Kingdom ascribed 36 neurological reactions to the
whole-cell pertussis vaccine, and although health authorities resisted pressure to withdraw
the vaccine during the panic that followed, the DTP coverage rate fell from 81 percent in
1974  to 31 percent after 1976, and a spike in pertussis incidence  ensued. When an
influential medical  leader in Sweden claimed that pertussis had become milder as a result of
economic,  social, and medical progress  and questioned the value of the vaccine, and when
Swedish pediatricians lost confidence  in the vaccine as a result of those questions  and the
attribution of some neurological  events to the vaccine, the coverage rate plummeted from
90 percent in 1974 to 12 percent in 1979. The pertussis incidence rate in Sweden increased
thirtyfold, with rates of serious complications approaching  global rates. Potential distrust of
immunization is perhaps unavoidable because vaccinations  entail, on the face of it,  an
inversion of the healing paradigm:  one goes when healthy to the clinician,  who injects a
substance  in one's arm that causes discomfort  and, in rare occasions,  an actual case of
illness. But it is also true that misleading or misunderstood information, expired and
ineffective vaccines,  dirty or reused syringes, and poorly trained staff can undermine trust
in immunization programs, resulting in lower coverage rates.
Supply-side  factors that affect immunization  coverage,  such as the quality of
vaccines, incentives  for the cadre of workers who perform vaccination,  and the organization
of national immunization  agencies, have received little attention in the literature.  One study
in Gujarat state in India argues that the agents who perform vaccines  for the Indian public
sector,  the so-called multi-purpose workers who live in and work from their home villages,
were excessively focused on numerical targets,  so much so that they did not explain the
purposes, benefits, and potential side effects of vaccines to patients, nor did they convey
- 7 -potentially useful information up to their superiors regarding the obstacles to immunization,
such as geographic challenges, caste and gender discrimination, and the influence of
mothers-in-law (Streefland  1995). Several  accounts of immunization policy have used the
concepts of "political will" or "political commitment" to explain the success of moves to
improve coverage  (UNICEF 1996 pp. 65-66, Madrid 1998a, Widdus  1999a, Justice 2000b,
2000c), conduct polio eradication activities (Hull and Aylward 2001), or introduce new
vaccines (Madrid 1998b, Huang and Lin 2000, Miller and Flanders  2000, Wenger 2001).
Put simply, the implication is that if political leaders were to make immunization a priority,
coverage rates (or polio eradication,  or the introduction of new vaccines)  would improve as
a result. However, as several writers have pointed out, the terms "political will" and
"political commitment" are "catch-all culprits" without much analytic content (Grindle and
Thomas  1991, Reich  1994). As one commentator put it, "political will [does] not arrive de
novo, so it is necessary to understand the elements that contribute to recognition of need,
and willingness (or capacity) to pay [for new vaccines]"  (Widdus 1  999a). Some of these
case studies have also pointed to the negative effects of decentralization  on immunization
rates. (Justice 2000a,b and Madrid  1998a,b).  In theory, decentralization  might make
coordination  among local health secretariats more difficult, and it might create a free rider
effect in which the incentives  for one jurisdiction to immunize its population are negatively
related to the strength of the immunization effort in neighboring jurisdictions. But it might
also, under certain conditions, improve  service delivery by making governments  more
accountable to and responsive to needs of local populations.
Studies that examine the determinants of vaccine adoption have focused primarily
on the informational prerequisites  for government decisionmaking. Mahoney and Maynard
(1999), reviewing the experience of the International Task Force on Hepatitis B
Immunization, found five factors to be significant:  (1) the establishment and dissemination
of disease burden data and cost-effectiveness computations;  (2) vaccine introduction trials
and effectiveness evaluations;  (3)  establishment of an international consensus on
recommendations  for vaccine use; (4) assurance of an adequate and competitive vaccine
supply; and (5) the creation of funding mechanisms to supply vaccine to countries unable to
finance their own procurement.  Hausdorff (1996), commenting on the rate of new vaccine
adoption,  suggested that the main determinant is "the extent to which international  and
bilateral  agencies and national governments  appreciate the potential value of new
vaccines." A study by the General Accounting Office of the United States (1999) drew
similar conclusions regarding the importance of locally tailored information,  both for new
vaccine adoption and for decisions to invest in immunization programs as a whole, and
highlighted the role of disease surveillance.  Levine and Levine (1997) emphasized  the role
of information, public perceptions, and the opinions of the medical community,  as did
- 8 -Wenger and others (2000) in their analysis of H. influenzae type B vaccine adoption.
Wenger (2001), Hausdorff (1996) and GAO (1999) pointed to the importance of price
barriers. Widdus  (1999b) analyzed both prerequisites  (recognition and information on the
target disease, the presence of a functioning immunization program) and modifying factors
(epidemiologic  and demographic  variables,  cues for action) that jointly shape a "perceived
threat of disease" which, in turn, influences decisionmakers'  perceptions of the risks,
benefits and barriers associated with new vaccine adoption. Miller and Flanders (2000)
identified a number of epidemiologic and economic  factors associated with the uptake of
hepatitis B and Haemophilus influenzae type B vaccines  into national  immunization
programs.  In their model,  variables significantly affecting the odds of adopting the vaccine
included GDP per capita (with an odds ratio of 4.4), vaccine cost per dose (OR 4.1),
vaccine cost as a fraction of per capita GDP (OR 39.7), current coverage with DTP vaccine
(OR 55.1),  and years of life lost per 1,000 infants due to the diseases in question (OR  6.9).
Using alternative models with composite variables, they find that a variable for potential
treatment costs prevented-a composite of data on disease burden, unit treatment costs and
immunization  coverage rates-has the highest odds ratio, at 127.4. All of these studies,
while pointing to the importance of information prerequisites leave unexamined the
question of what motivated decisionmakers  to conduct epidemiological  analyses to begin
with, the question of, in other words, the political sources of immunization policy. Where
they are consistent  with the present analysis is the finding that the role of bureaucratic elites
has been important in shaping immunization policies over the past two decades.
The history of smallpox vaccination offers lessons regarding the organization of
immunization efforts. The Swedish Crown encountered significant  resistance when it tried
to implement a campaign  for smallpox inoculation  in the eighteenth century, even though
some 300,000 people died of smallpox between 1750 and 1800; but its subsequent
campaign using the vaccine derived  from cowpox virus was much more successful.  Sweden
became one of the first countries to make vaccination  compulsory in 1816 and vaccinated
80 percent of newborn children by 1821.  Skold (1996) attributes this to the superiority of
vaccination technology, but also to institutional factors, such as the influence of the
international press (80 percent of articles published between  1798 and 1801 favored
vaccination),  the removal of the authority to vaccinate from a physicians'  monopoly, the
enlistment of the clergy and church assistants, who  did most of the vaccinating and received
certificates of competence from the district medical officer, free vaccines offered to the
poor, and a system of rewards  given to the "most skilled" vaccinators. Rigau-Perez'  (1989)
study of the introduction of  smallpox inoculations to Puerto Rico in 1803 also emphasizes
the critical role of the clergy in obtaining the community's trust. In Puerto Rico the colonial
authorities had anticipated  the Royal Expedition of the Vaccine from Spain and introduced
-g9-inoculation techniques with so much community involvement "that children, in their games
at school, vaccinated each other." But the initial  success of the effort foundered as a result
of conflicts between colonial and royal authorities,  and Puerto Rico's smallpox program
lagged far behind many of its Latin American neighbors, lending an ominously prophetic
tone to a comment of the King's emissary, who had said in a letter that he was coming "not
only to bring vaccine, but to assure its perpetuation, which is the hardest [task]."
Variables and Sources of Data
Immunization coverage. Data on immunization coverage rates obtained from WHO
and UNICEF measure the proportion of children who have received the DTP3 or measles
vaccine by one year of age and are based on either service delivery records  or, where
available, on coverage surveys carried out under the auspices of the EPI program using a
standardized 30-cluster sampling technique which collects information directly from
households (Henderson and Sundaresan 1982, WHO  1991).  l Coverage rates are recorded
without indication of the specific methods used to collect them, though survey data-which
are considered to be more valid than service statistics, particularly in countries  where
routine reporting systems are not well-developed-are  used wherever possible,  including
from sources outside the EPI system such as the immunization  section of the Demographic
and Health Surveys (UNICEF  1996).
Several studies have voiced concern over the disparity between coverage rates
reported from service delivery records and "actual" coverage rates measured by sample
surveys (Boerma and others 1990, UNICEF  1996,  WHO 1999).  In one study, 30.4 percent
of reported figures were considered "unexpected"  when assessed against a set of internal
and external validation criteria (WHO  1999); in another, reported coverage was found to
exceed  survey coverage by over 20 percent in a small sample of case-study countries
including Uganda, India,  and the Philippines (UNICEF  1996). Various explanations are
possible for these discrepancies, which may derive from inaccuracies in either reported or
survey data. Survey data, while generally considered more valid than data from service
records, are not invariably accurate.  Case definitions and the method of obtaining data may
differ from survey to survey, and other differences in survey methodology-between  the
EPI's cluster sampling method and the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) approach,
for example-may also result in different estimates for the same population (Boerma and
others 1990). Surveys typically obtain coverage information from maternal recall,
immunization cards or both (WHO  1991, Boerma and others 1990, Boerma and Bicego
'While  immunization schedules vary from country  to country, most require the DTP3 vaccine to be
given at 3 to 6 months and the measles vaccine  at 9 to  12 months. For more details, see WHO (2000).
- 10 -1993). "Card plus history" approaches  are generally the most accurate, though even these
underestimate  "true" coverage levels to a small extent.  Some surveys use a sampling frame
that is limited to "women of child-bearing  age,"  generally  15 to 49 years, which may
additionally underestimate  true coverage  levels by excluding children in the care of older
caregivers-a common occurrence in countries suffering from conflict or, more recently,
HIV/AIDS  (World Bank 1997).  Other methodologic issues have also been discussed, with
criticisms of the ±10 percentage  point accuracy of the WHO's cluster sampling method
(Lemeshow and others  1985) and discussion of other methods of obtaining coverage
information  such as modified cluster surveys and Lot Quality Assurance methods (Bennett
and others  1991; Lemeshow and Robinson  1985; Lanata and others  1990; Sandiford  1993;
Turner, Magnani, and Shuaib  1996; WHO  1996a; WHO  1999; Hoshaw-Woodard  2001).
However, given the simplicity and inexpensiveness  of the WHO's 30-cluster survey
approach, and the fact that it generally compares well with data from nationally
representative  surveys such as the DHS (Boerma and others  1990, Boerma and Bicego
1993), this method remains the most common way of obtaining coverage  data by survey.
Coverage data from service records are also subject to a wide range of inaccuracies.
Like survey data, reported data can suffer from nonsystematic errors such as mistakes in
data entry, transcription and analysis. Also, since service records are seldom complete,
national coverage  levels must be estimated  from available data using a variety of
assumptions, introducing an additional source of possible error (Boerma and others 1990).
Children over the age of one are frequently included in the numerator of reported data, a
systematic error that artificially inflates rates and gives an inaccurate picture of true
coverage,2 while data on the target population-the denominator  in coverage calculations-
are frequently based on projections from old or inaccurate censuses and may seriously over-
or under-state the correct denominator in these calculations  (UNICEF  1996). Perhaps more
serious, however,  is the possibility of deliberate rate inflation or data falsification.  This is of
particular  concern in systems where data is collected principally to measure progress
against targets rather than to guide program decisions at local or district levels (UNICEF
1996).  In such systems, pressure from superiors to reach unrealistic targets or increases in
coverage may lead health workers to inflate coverage data, and these in turn may find their
way into national and international health statistics, particularly in the absence of effective
monitoring  and supervision systems.3 A separate possibility is that overworked front-line
2 Since the standard definition of  coverage  is based on a child's vaccination status at one year of age,
-including children who have received these  vaccines after their first year artificially increases the numerator
in coverage calculations.
3 These pressures can originate ftom intemational  organizations as well as national public health
bureaucracies,  such as during the last phases of the "Universal Child Immunization" initiative when UNICEF
- II  -health workers may neglect immunization responsibilities-especially if other programs
come with stronger incentives  or are perceived as having greater priority-and may attempt
to conceal this by fabricating, falsifying or exaggerating data (UNICEF 1996, Nair and
others 2001 ).4
The key question for the present study is the extent to which these considerations
may affect the study's analysis.  Setting aside random errors, the principal concern is
whether there are systematic errors in the coverage data that differ according to other
country characteristics such as national income.  To examine this, reported data on measles
and DPT3 coverage from the WHO database were compared with similar data from DHS
surveys for 82 country-years (DHS, 1985 to 1997). Figures 1 and 2 indicate the relationship
between WHO and DHS data for these countries, for DTP3 and measles, respectively.
There was no significant difference  in the average measles coverage  data reported in the
DHS and WHO datasets, but DPT3 coverage was significantly higher in the WHO data by
an average of 4.1 percent (s=2.04, p<0.05).5 More importantly, this difference  in DPT3
rates was the same across all country income categories for which DHS data were available
(low, lower middle and upper middle), suggesting  that discrepancies between reported and
"actual" rates do not differ according to countries'  national income.6 Since DHS data were
not available for any high-income  countries,  a possible difference there can not be ruled
out; but in general, these findings suggest that using reported rates-particularly for
measles7-as a dependent  variable is reasonable, particularly given the absence of any
itself admitted that "global pressure for achieving  UCI" may have adversely affected the accuracy of reported
coverage rates in 1990 (UNICEF 1996, page 40).
4Nair and others (2001)  report performance exaggeration in all programs other than imnunization in
their study of village health workers in Kerala, India. They acknowledge  that this might have been an artefact
of programmatic  factors specific to the Kerala context-in particular, the ability of households to obtain
immunization from a wide variety of sources other than village health workers-rather than a demonstration
of  more accurate reporting of inmmunization  figures by the VHWs themselves.
5Figures I and 2 illustrate these errors as the distance of each country from the line yx. India, Yemen
and Bangladesh,  for example,  report highly exaggerated coverage rates, up to 40 percent higher than the rates
found in DHS surveys; while countries  such as Kenya and Ghana report rates that are between 20 and 40
percent lower than those reported in DHS surveys.
6 Improbable reports of immunization coverage are also seen in some high income countries. Austria, for
example, reports 90 percent coverage with DPT3 in every year since 1980, and reports its measles coverage in
strict multiples of five. Apparent inaccuracies  in coverage data may also be a result of transcription  or data
entry errors, such as New Zealand's 114 percent coverage rate for measles in 1991. This was manually
corrected to 91 percent, based on its linear relationship with DTP3.
' It is interesting to speculate as to why reported measles figures tend to be more accurate than reported
figures for DPT3. Since DPT3 requires the successful,  timely completion of a course of three vaccinations, the
cumulative likelihood of error-both in administering the vaccine and in recording or recalling this event-
may be higher than for measles, which only requires a single shot and can also be administered in "catch-up"
or "one shot" campaigns. This is borne out by coverage comparisons,  in which measles coverage is generally
higher than DPT3 coverage. (Boerna et al.  1996) This in itself doesn't explain differences  in the accuracy of
reported data for the two vaccines, however. It is possible that the greater discrepancy between reported and
- 12 -significant evidence  for systematic bias. Further attempts to explain intercountry
differences  in DPT3  figures between WHO and DHS data found only one variable, the log
of total population, to be a significant determinant of these differences  (p=O.03). 8
Figure 1: WHO vs. DHS Coverage  Rates, DTP3 Vaccine
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survey figures for DPT3 represents the cumulative effect of a fixed "tolerance"  for error on the part of those
who record service statistics,  a tolerance that manifests only once with measles but three times for the DTP
series. In other words,  service recorders may "accept" a DPT3 that comes off-schedule if the previous doses
have been administered correctly (or recorded as such), whereas their decision to accept or reject a measles
vaccination  as correct is based on a single event alone. Both of these are in contrast to survey data, which are
generally based on time-specified maternal recall or entries on an immunization  card and may therefore be
less  susceptible to such errors.
8 The fact that population is a significant deternminant of inaccurate  reporting may simply reflect the
inherent difficulties associated with collecting this type of data in large populations.  Perhaps more interesting
is the fact that none of  the ICRG variables-which included measures of government corruption, bureaucratic
quality and the overall quality of governance-were  significant, and neither were variables for population
density, illiteracy rates and democracy.
- 13 -Figure 2: WHO vs. DHS Coverage Rates, Measles  Vaccine
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Introduction of  new vaccines. Data on the introduction of hepatitis B and
Haemophilus influenzae type B vaccines into countries' routine infant immunization
programs were obtained from WH:O and various sources in the published literature (WHO
1995; WHO  1996b-e; Van Damme, Kane, and Meheus 1997; Vryheid and others 2000;
Wenger and others 2000; Van Damme 2001; WHO 2000).  These data were converted into
two forms: a binary variable indicating whether or not the given vaccine was in use in a
particular  country-year,  and a continuous variable for the observed coverage rate in each
country-year.  In view of the small number of observations  for which actual coverage data
were available, the binary measure was used as the dependent variable of choice, with
logistic regression to estimate the odds of vaccine adoption.9 Also, since only 23 countries
were reporting routine Haemophilus influenzae type B immunization by 1997, the use of
9For many countries, information was only available on whether or not routine immunization against
hepatitis B or Haemophilus influenzae type B had commenced, and not on the coverage rates obtained. The
use of a binary outcome variable  enabled us to use this information to maximum effect,  and was also
consistent with our interest in the determinants  of vaccine adoption, as distinct from countries'  ability to
rapidly increase their coverage with these vaccines. Vryheid and colleagues (2000) point out that the use of
government statistics may actually underestimate  true coverage rates for new vaccines,  since many of these
are initially delivered more through the private medical sector than through public channels.
-14-this variable was set aside in favor of the variable for immunization against hepatitis B, for
which there were 68 countries reporting routine use by 1997.
Political  and institutional  variables. Variables  for democracy  and regime durability
were taken from the Polity IV dataset of Marshall  and Jaggers (2000). Democracy is
measured as a composite of three variables measuring the competitiveness  of political
participation,  the openness  and competitiveness of executive  recruitment, and the extent of
constraints on the chief executive.  Munck and Verkuilen (2000), in their comparison  of
alternative measures of democracy, point out that the democracy variable in Polity IV may
be flawed on two grounds. First, they point out that there is no variable  for electoral
participation,  and that the measurement of democracy is therefore biased towards political
contestation;10 and second, they suggest that the use of two related and potentially
overlapping variables to measure  executive recruitment-one  for openness  and one for
competitiveness-is  neither theoretically justified nor empirically valid. Neither of these
concerns is of particular relevance to the present  study. In the first place, data are used for
the years between  1980 and 1997, during which time electoral participation is generally
accepted to have been well established in most countries." 1 Also, the data on democracy are
presented in both their composite  and disaggregated forms, allowing us to test the impacts
of the component  and aggregate variables separately and to draw our own conclusions  as to
the effects of each. Regime durability, also from Polity IV, was measured as the number of
years since the last regime change or the number of years since 1900, whichever is smaller.
Other political variables were taken  from the World Bank's Database of Political
Institutions and the State Failure Project of Gurr and colleagues (Beck and others 2000;
Gurr, Harff, and Marshall 1997).  The DPI provided data on characteristics  of the chief
executive and on the extent of political decentralization,  with variables encompassing the
ideology, terrn, term limits  and military affiliation of the chief executive and the presence,
nature and authority of subnational authorities. The State Failure Project provided data on
the existence of revolutionary or ethnic wars, adverse  regime events, and instances of
genocide or politicide.  In both cases, the data were collected and scrutinized by a single
'° This draws on Robert Dahl's description of democracy  as having two dimensions:  contestation or
competition,  and participation  or inclusiveness  (1971: pp. 4-6).
" "Indeed,  it is fairly accurate to state that after 1945  countries either had or did not have inclusive
elections,  as the partial extension of the right to vote ceased to be a viable option. Exceptions  to this
generalization include Switzerland,  where women were denied the right to vote until  1971,  and many Latin
American countries in which women gained the right to vote [already granted to men] in the  1950s. Beyond
these cases, women had gained the right to vote in older democracies  prior to  1945 and always gained the
right to vote in countries that became  independent  after 1945 at the same time as men did. Class-based
restrictions  on participation had also disappeared for the most part by  1945." From Munck and Verkuilen
(2000, p. 24);  see also Ramirez,  Soysal, and Shanahan (1997).
- 15 -research group over the entire period of their development  and can therefore be reasonably
assumed to be internally consistent,  in spite of the subjective nature of some of their
measures.
Variables on institutional quality were taken from IRIS  3, a dataset based on the
International  Country Risk Guide, a rating system established in 1980 to provide annual
measures of political, financial and economic risk in 135 countries  (Knack and IRIS 2000;
PRS Group 2000). This provided six variables,  all from the political risk section of the
ICRG, including measures of bureaucratic  quality, corruption in government,  ethnic
tensions, risk of expropriation of property, risk of repudiation of government contracts,  and
strength of the rule of law. With the exception of the variable for ethnic tensions, the
remaining variables were highly correlated,  so a composite variable for "institutional
quality" was created as a weighted combination of these five.12 Ethnic tension was kept as a
separate variable.
Economic variables. Economic variables taken from the World Bank's World
Development Indicators (2000a) included measures of national income, government
resource availability, sectoral priorities and macroeconomic  stability. Countries were
grouped into four income categories on the basis of the World Bank classification reported
in each year's World Development Report (World Bank 2000b)." 3
Demographic, infrastructure, health and education variables. Information on
demographic characteristics, infrastructure,  health and education were also obtained from
the World Bank's World Development Indicators. These data are typically based on
censuses, surveys, registration systems or government reports and accounts, all of which are
22 The ICRG dataset included separate entries for North Yemen, also known as the Yemen Arab
Republic, and South Yemen, also known as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, prior to their
reunification in 1991.  Since the other variables did not make this distinction, we took the mean value of ICRG
variables  from North and South Yemen for the years prior to unification, and used these figures in our
analysis. Regressions were also carried out using the maximum and minimum values for these variables, but
there was no substantial change in the coefficients or their level of significance.  Results are therefore
presented using the average  value of ICRG variables for North and South Yemen for the years prior to 1991,
and with the "all Yemen" values thereafter. The ICRG corruption score for Ireland  1982 was set at 6.2 in the
original data. This was changed to 6.0, the maximum score.  The institutional quality score was created by
multiplying by 0.6 the scores for repudiation and expropriation (which are on a 10 point scale), and adding
them to the scores for bureaucratic  quality, the rule of law, and corruption  (which were already on a 6 point
scale). Changing the weights had no effect on the results.
23 For the years prior to 1987, when income categories  were not reported in the WDR, countries were
allocated to income categories  on the basis of their borrowing  status, since the definition of these categories
(such as "civil works preference"  for low income countries,  and "IBRD eligible" for upper middle income
countries)  was seen to correspond to the income thresholds subsequently adopted. For more,  see World Bank
(2001).
- 16-subject to inaccuracies  ranging from incomplete data collection and inappropriate survey
methodologies  to inconsistent case definitions  and outright data falsification. In some cases,
interpolation of data from existing figures-intercensus  estimates of population size and
age structure, for example,  or estimates of public vs. private health spending-adds  a
further layer of possible bias, since the quality of these estimates is directly related to the
quality of data on which they were originally based. These issues call into the question the
reliability and validity of these data and might be of concern to more focused analyses; but
for our purposes, the WDI dataset provides perhaps the most complete source of time-series
data available on these variables, and it allows us to test our general hypotheses with
acceptable  validity.  Given the nonlinear relationships between immunization  coverage and
population size, population density,  and per capita GDP, these three variables were
converted to a (natural) logarithmic  form.
Immunization-specific variables. Variables related directly to countries'
immunization policies and practices were obtained from a variety of sources. Data on
immunization rates and the adoption of new vaccines were obtained from WHO and
UNICEF, as described earlier. Data on participation in UNICEF's Vaccine Independence
Initiative were also obtained from UNICEF,  as were similar data from PAHO on countries'
participation  in its revolving fund.14 A period dummy was used to measure the impact of
accelerated Universal Child Immunization activities from 1985 to 1990 (UNICEF  1996).
Data on polio incidence and polio vaccine coverage were obtained from WHO,
allowing us to examine the relationship between polio eradication activities and coverage
rates for DTP3 and measles vaccines.  WHO data on the incidence of other vaccine
" UNICEF provides  two general categories of procurement assistance to countries. Most countries use
UNICEF as a procurement  intermediary, paying for their vaccines in advance  and ordering through UNICEF
as a way of assuring vaccine quality and obtaining lower prices.  Others participate in the "Vaccine
Independence  Initiative,"  a financing mechanism that establishes a revolving fund for each country and
enables countries to buy their vaccines in local currency and pay for them only after deliveries have been
made. This study used the variable for VII membership. The European Union's ARIVAS program ("Appui au
Renforcement  de l'Independence  Vaccinale en Afrique Sahelienne") provides structural  adjustment funding
for immunization  to a number of West African countries by creating a vaccine- or immunization-specific  line
item in the government budget and providing procurement assistance  through UNICEF's Vaccine
Independence  Initiative. Data for the ARIVAS fund were not available for use in this paper. The PAHO
revolving fund, established in 1979,  acts as a financing intermediary  for almost all countries in Latin America
and the Caribbean region.  Like UNICEF's VII, the PAHO fund enables countries to buy vaccine  in local
currency and pay for them once orders are received; but unlike  the VII, which establishes a separate revolving
fund for each country, the PAHO fund is a single fund from which all participating  countries draw.  The
variable for participation in PAHO's Revolving Fund was set at zero both for non-participating  countries  and
for all countries outside Latin America and the Caribbean region. Of the 208 countries in our dataset,  104
countries procured their vaccines  through UNICEF, 22 of which took part in the Vaccine Independence
Initiative,  and 35 countries were enrolled in PAHO's revolving  fund. For more details,  see De Roeck and
Levin (1998) and Khaleghian (2001).
- 17-preventable diseases-those covered by the DTP3 and measles vaccines in particular-
were included to study connections between disease incidence and changes in
immunization  coverage. Data quality issues related to these variables are similar to those
discussed in the earlier section on immunization coverage.  The measurement of disease
incidence,  however, is subject to additional inaccuracies,  since it relies more on routine
surveillance than periodic data collection and can be adversely affected if this surveillance
is of poor or variable quality (WHO  1998).
Methods
The cross-sectional  time-series data used in this analysis consist of repeated
measurements on the same unit, the state or nation, that are "pooled" with those of other
units to provide a combination of longitudinal  and cross-sectional  information.  These are
typically expressed using the form
Yit = ,Xi,  + eit
where X is a vector of observations for unit i at time t and Y is the dependent variable of
interest. Generally speaking,  models of this form are not estimated by ordinary least-
squares methods due to the presence of spatially-  and temporally-correlated  errors and the
possibility of heteroskedasticity between panels' 5. Analysis of these data therefore requires
techniques that are robust to both autocorrelation and panel heteroskedasticity.  Generalized
least squares (GLS) methods are generally considered the most efficient  approach, since
they can specify the autocorrelation  structure of the data and account for it directly.  A wide
variety of alternative correlation structures can be used for this purpose, but all of them
require more knowledge of the error structure that one typically has, especially in
complicated models where neither prior theory nor exploratory  analysis provides  a basis for
selecting a specification. 16
'5 Spatially- and temporally-correlated  errors  are common in cross-sectional time-series  data. In most
such data, the error terms associated with successive observations on the same unit-the observations for
Australia  in 1995 and Australia in 1996, for example-are  correlated with each other. The same is true of
spatially-related units, such as countries in the same geographic region or states that are subject to similar
exogenous influences.  Heteroskedasticity,  or non-equal variance of errors, is also common.  Both of  these can
be demonstrated on the variance-covariance  matrix of the disturbance term:  autocorrelation  as a pattem in
which the off-diagonal  elements (error term covariances)  are non-zero,  and heteroskedasticity  as a pattem in
which these elements are non-equal. (Kennedy  1992).
6 GLS models can be specified with one of three autocorrelation mnatrices  for within-panel data:
independent,  autoregressive (AR),  or panel-specific  autoregressive (PSAR). In the independent specification,
within-panel correlation  is assumed to be non-existent,  and the time values within the panel are ignored. In
autoregressive models, serial or "multiplicative" correlation-in which successive correlations are
approximately equal, with either a common (AR) or a panel-specific  (PSAR) correlation parameter-is
- 18-Alternatively,  fixed-effects models can be used to estimate coefficients  on the basis
of within-group data alone, thus eliminating one source of correlation (spatial correlation,
correlation between panels); or, if  within- and between-group correlations  are thought to be
equivalent (or "random"',  then random effects models can be used instead, with Hausman's
test to distinguish between the two. Fixed effects coefficients  ('within estimators')  describe
the time-series information in the data (e.g., "What is the expected change in hidia's
immunization coverage if  xi is changed by 1?"), while "between estimators"  describe the
cross-sectional  inforrnation in the data (e.g.,  "What is the anticipated difference between
immunization  coverage in India and Costa Rica if they differ in xi by 1?") (Gould 2001).
The Hausman test is equivalent to testing whether the coefficients from within estimation
(i.e., fixed effects)  are the same as those from between estimation. If these are equivalent,
then the distribution of differences is the same within and between observations  and a
random effects model is appropriate; but if not, then the analytic method of choice depends
on whether one is interested in within effects, between effects, or both.1 7
A problem with this approach is that it leaves open the question of how to adjust for
time effects. Given the wide range of time-varying determinants of immunization  coverage,
from donor preferences to radio ownership to the quality of public institutions, the
modeling of these effects becomes an especially important issue. If the pattern of time
effects were known or could be estimated, then this could be solved by using a GLS model
or generalized estimating equation with the correctly-specified  correlation matrix, thus
correcting for both time effects  and panel heteroskedasticity.  In the absence of such
knowledge, however, and given our uncertainty over the pattern of time effects, we
concluded that a simpler approach-one that would be less dependent  on a precise
specification of the within-panel  correlation structure of the data-would be preferable.18
assumed.  Generalized Estimating Equations,  an extension of General Linear Models that allow for panel data
to be estimated by GLM, expand the range of within panel-correlation  structures to include  exchangeable,
stationary, non-stationary,  unstructured,  and user-defined  specifications.  See Stata (1999, pp.  338-369) and
Diggle, Liang,  and Zeger (1994).
" Random effects GLS models produce  coefficients that are a matrix-weighted average of the
coefficients  obtained from the within and between estimations.  Fixed effects models are the equivalent of
OLS with a dummy variable for each unit of interest. See Kennedy  (1992, pp.  222-3) and Stata (1999, pp.
420-40).
18 A second problem with GLS is that it requires models to be completely specified, and becomes biased
in the presence of within-panel  correlation.  This is problemnatic  for our purposes,  since it is highly unlikely
that our models are completely specified-at least not in the sense of capturing all the possible time-varying
influences on immunization  coverage-so the assumption of within-panel  homoskedasticity can not be met,
even if we include some sort of adjustment  for time effects. Using GLS in these circumstances would result in
an anticonservative  bias in the standard errors (Stata  1999, Wiggins 1999). For a discussion of the relative
accuracy of OLS and robust estimation of standard errors  vs. GLS models in the analysis of cross-sectional
time-series  data, see Beck and Katz (1995).
- 19-We therefore adopted a simpler, though less efficient, method of analysis.  This
involved the use of country dummies to adjust for heteroskedasticity between panels as well
as unobserved  or imperfectly-measured variables at the country level; year dummies to hold
constant time-varying  effects not captured by the variables  included in the model; and OLS
regressions with a Huber/White  estimator to provide variance estimates robust to both
panel-level heteroskedasticity  and within-panel correlation.  Results are therefore reported
for models with fixed country and year effects. Tobit regression was used to censor
observations were immunization coverage was less than zero or greater than 100 percent.
These estimations could not be relied upon to provide unbiased standard errors in the
presence of heteroskedasticity or non-spherical  error terms. Since fewer than 12
observations were censored by the tobit regression in each model, and since the parameter
estimates from tobit regression were essentially the same as those of the clustered OLS
regressions originally conducted, the latter were considered unbiased.19 The study's results
are therefore presented as OLS regressions with robust standard errors, in Table 1. The
selected models below were also estimated using GLS specifications, and the results were
very similar to the preferred fixed country and fixed time specification.20 Robustness
9 Tobit regression produced eleven right-censored observations  for DTP3 and seven right-censored
observations  for measles.
20  GLS estimations were carried out with autoregressive and panel-specific  specifications,  and GEE
estimations with autoregressive,  unstructured and exchangeable correlation structures. The unstructured
specification, while theoretically the most appropriate  for complex data with no clear correlation  structure,
could not be successfully calculated  after 10,000 iterations of maximum-likelihood GEE estimation. ARI  and
AR2 specifications  with GEE provided coefficients that were similar in magnitude and direction to those
obtained using the year and country dummies, though their standard errors differed to some extent. As
expected,  GLS estimations provided exaggerated  estimates of significance (with independent, ARI  and
PSAR1  specifications  and an adjustment for panel heteroskedasticity)  as compared with those obtained using
year and country dummies, though again,  the magnitude and direction of the coefficients  were broadly similar.
More specifically,  in the eight additional regressions undertaken (three with GLS and one with GEE, for both
DTP and measles),  illiteracy was significant and negative in all eight (as it was in robust OLS with year but
not country fixed effects,  with coefficients ranging from -0.4 to -0.6), log of GDP was significant and
positive in six (with coefficients,  when significant, ranging from  1.04 to 1.50), log of  population was
significant and negative in three, log of population density was significant and positive in five, participation  in
the UNICEF fund was positive and significant in seven (coefficients 7.61  to 13.11), participation  in the PAHO
fund was significant and negative in six (it was negative  in robust OLS without fixed country effects;  GLS
and GEE coefficients ranged from -3.25 to -9.04), foreign aid was significant and positive in seven (as it was
in robust OLS without fixed country effects, coefficients 0.13 to 0.30), TVs per capita was significant and
positive in all eight (as it was in robust OLS without fixed country effects,  coefficients 0.04 to 0.06),
democracy score was significant and positive in all eight (coefficients  5.14 to 6.77), state failure was never
significant,  institutional quality was significant and positive in all eight (coefficients  0.94 to  1.69), and the
interaction of democracy and log of GDP was significant  and negative in al eight (coefficients -0.64 to -1. 18).
The Durbin-Watson statistic of 0.8857, calculated using Bhargava et al. 's modification for panel data,
provided  a suggestive but inconclusive indication of the autoregressive character of the data (Bhargava,
Franzini,  and Narendrananthan  1982; Stata 2001). It was elected to take the more conservative approach using
dummy variables  for year and country rather than specifying a particular AR pattem.
- 20 -checks were conducted on the final models,  including the exclusion of high leverage
observations.  Again, the basic findings of the analysis were unchanged.21
For the analysis of hepatitis B vaccine adoption, we used a logit model with a binary
outcome variable indicating whether or not the vaccine was in use in each country-year.
Year dummies were used to fix time effects,  in keeping with the logic descnrbed
above, but the sample size was too small for the inclusion of country fixed effects.
The model specification is the same as for the coverage rate data, with the addition of
current year DTP coverage rates as a right-hand-side variable. This was included to test the
hypothesis that countries might be more inclined to adopt new vaccines if existing
immunization delivery systems are strong.  The results are reported  as odds ratios with
robust standard errors, in Table 2.
Table  1: Determinants of EPI vaccine coverage  rates, low-  and middle-income  countries,  1980-
1997
DTP coverage.  Measles coverage:
robust OLS with fixed country  robust OLS with fixed country
andfixed  year effects  andfixed year effects
(n = 963)  (n =937)
Coefficient  SE  Coefficient  SE
Illiteracy Rate  0.30  0.30  0.82**  0.35
Log GDP per capita (1995 US$)  12.09**  3.96  19.79**  5.54
Log Population (nillions)  -5.79  6.09  0.60  7.15
Log Population Density  -11.12  6.68  -11.45  7.78
Membership:  UJNICEF Vaccine Fund  8.62**  3.25  10.39**  3.12
Membership:  PAHO  Revolving Fund  13.67**  3.91  16.93**  4.92
Foreign Aid (% of GDP)  -0.05  0.06  -0.14  0.07
TVs per capita  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01
Democracy Score (Polity IV)  9.45**  1.22  10.38**  1.36
Existence of State Failure  -3.60**  1.72  -1.21  1.75
Institutional Quality Score (ICRG)  1.14**  0.21  1.06**  0.24
Interaction Term:  Log GDP per capita
(1995 US$) x Democracy Score  -1.42**  0.17  -1.58**  0.20
**Significant at p < 0.05. Regressions  include constants.
21 Dropping high leverage observations leads the variable for state failure to lose significance  in the
measles estimation with fixed country and fixed year effects.  The coefficients  and standard errors on the other
significant variables  change very little. No variable gains or loses significance in the DTP estimation.
-21 -Table 2: Determinants of Hepatitis B vaccine  adoption, low-  and middle-income  countries,
1980-1997
Hepatitis  B adoption: robust Logit
with fzxed year effects  (n = 922)
Odds ratio  Z-score
DTP Coverage Rate  1.03**  2.24
Illiteracy Rate  1.02  1.45
Log GDP per capita (1995 US$)  2.99**  3.09
Log Population  0.75  -1.84
Log Population Density  1.01  0.05
Membership:  JNICEF Vaccine Fund  0.05**  -2.18
Membership:  PAHO Revolving Fund  0.15**  -4.30
Foreign Aid (% of GDP)  0.96  -1.88
TVs per capita  1.00  -1.64
Democracy Score (Polity IV)  3.65**  3.77
Existence of State failure  0.83  -0.40
Institutional quality score (ICRG)  1.34**  4.62
Interaction Termn: Log GDP per capita (1995 US$) x Democracy
Score  0.83**  -3.97
**Significant  at p < 0.05.
Table 3: Determinants of EPI vaccine coverage  rates, DHS data
DTP coverage:  Measles coverage:
robust OLS withfixed year  robust OLS withfixed year
effects(n = 71)  effects(n = 71)
Coefficient  SE  Coefficient  SE
Illiteracy Rate  -0.46**  0.10  -0.28**  0.08
Log GDP per capita (1995 US$)  9.06**  3.78  9.42**  3.15
Log Population (millions)  -2.44  2.23  -0.87  1.96
Log Population Density  2.01  1.67  0.17  1.60
Membership:  UNICEF Vaccine Fund  12.70  6.55  10.50  6.03
Membership:  PAHO Revolving  Fund  -9.20  6.16  -0.56  4.98
ForeignAid(%ofGDP)  0.44**  0.15  0.45**  0.15
TVs per capita  0.03  0.03  -0.01  0.03
Democracy Score (Polity IV)  7.78**  3.61  3.87  3.60
Existence  of State Failure  4.30  4.93  6.41  3.92
Institutional Quality Score (ICRG)  1.98**  0.63  1.17**  0.47
Interaction  Term: Log GDP per capita
(1995 US$) x Democracy Score  -1.18**  0.55  -0.72  0.54
**Significant at p < 0.05. Regressions  include constants.
-22 -Table 4: Summary statistics for estimation sample using WHO data
Correlations  with vaccine coverage
Mean  SD  n  (DTP, Measles) and adoption (Hep B)
Variables used in the regressions  DTP  Measles  Hep B
Illiteracy rate  32.71  24.94  2158  -0.43  -0.41  -0.08
GDP per capita (log)  7.05  1.17  2338  0.37  0.36  0.19
Population (log)  15.16  2.11  2922  -0.06  -0.05  -0.09
Population density (log)  3.85  1.52  2553  0.15  0.08  0.01
Participation  in VII  0.02  0.12  3148  0.06  0.08  -0.04
Participation in PAHO Fund  0.19  0.39  3148  0.00  0.07  -0.17
Foreign aid (% GDP)  10.04  15.18  2156  -0.10  -0.08  -0.08
TVs per capita  126.29  141.56  2675  0.47  0.49  0.30
Democracy score  3.06  3.78  2017  0.23  0.23  -0.03
State failure  0.16  0.37  3148  -0.08  -0.11  -0.08
Institutional quality  15.84  5.00  1482  0.53  0.51  0.38
Democracy x Log(GDP)  25.06  29.53  1769  0.24  0.25  -0.03
Missing variable  frequencies
Illiteracyrate missing  0.31  0.46  0.11  0.10  0.12
GDP per capita missing  0.26  0.44  -0.02  -0.02  0.03
Population missing  0.07  0.26  0.10  0.08  0.00
Population density missing  0.19  0.39  0.10  0.11  0.04
Participation in VII missing  0  0
Participation in PAHO missing  0  0
Foreign aid missing  0.32  0.46  0.14  0.11  -0.01
TVs per capita missing  0.15  0.36  0.03  -0.03  0.06
Democracy score missing  0.36  0.48  0.12  0.07  0.15
State failure missing  0  0
Institutional quality missing  0.53  0.50  -0.05  -0.08  0.03
Democracy x Log(GDP)  missing  0.44  0.50  0.08  0.03  0.11
Findings
The models in Tables 1 and 2 were identified using a combination of forward and
backward selection. A number of economic, social, demographic,  political, and
programmatic variables were not included in the final models either because the variables
were not significant, or because the inclusion of the variables reduced the sample size to a
point where the findings did not appear robust to small changes in the data or the
specification.  As a result, the verdicts on some hypotheses that this analysis was intended to
examine,  such as the impact of decentralization  on immunization coverage,  and the effects
of paved roads, health spending, and access to health care facilities  and health personnel,
were inconclusive.  There were 3,148 potential observations  in the dataset (country-years
from  1980-1997 among low- and middle-income  countries).  Dropping observations with
missing data for GDP per capita and immunization coverage  shrunk the potential dataset to
- 23 -1,983 observations for DTP, 1,897 observations for measles, and 2,195 observations for
hepatitis B adoption. The final models include about half that number of observations
because of countries with missing data for the variables selected. The correlations between
observations with missing data flags and coverage rates were generally weak (Table 4),
suggesting that deleted observations are not biasing the results.
The c-statistic for the hepatitis B vaccine adoption model presented in Table 2 is 93
percent. In that model the coefficient for the DTP coverage rate variable is significant, and
the odds ratio is, with a 95 percent confidence interval,  1.002 to 1.061, much lower than
that found by Miller and Flanders (2000), who report an odds ratio for current DTP
coverage rates of, with 95 percent confidence,  10.4 to 292.6.  The reason for this is that
Miller and Flanders do not include measures of the underlying political and institutional
determinants of current coverage rates, including those (such as democracy,  institutional
quality and membership in procurement  assistance schemes) that are found to be significant
in the present study. Here, those variables are included separately,  and the influence of DTP
coverage on the adoption of new vaccines  is commensurately reduced.  Countries with
strong institutions,  autonomous public health agencies, and contacts with international
donors are probably also those with the epidemiological  and economic capacities necessary
to justify new vaccine adoption, such as by calculating the years of life lost due to a disease
or estimating treatment costs averted by a vaccination program.
This  might  explain  why  Miller  and  Flanders  find  these  epidemiological  and
economic  measures  to  be significant  determinants  of new vaccine  adoption.  However,  a
fuller understanding of this process will require more detailed qualitative  research such  as
Muraskin's  (1995)  analysis of the adoption  of hepatitis B vaccine  in New Zealand and the
work of Wenger and colleagues in Qatar, Chile, Uruguay and Kuwait (2000).
The model used in Tables  1 and 2 was also tested on the much smaller sample of
countries with coverage rate data taken from DHS surveys, the results of which are
presented in Table 3.  The sample size was too small for the inclusion of fixed country
effects, but the regression did include fixed year effects. Table 3 shows that, given the
differences in sample size, the magnitudes of the coefficients and their significance  levels
are generally consistent with estimates based on the larger sample of countries with WHO
data. Among the differences  are the fact that in the regressions based on DHS data the
illiteracy and foreign aid variables  are significant negative and positive, respectively, and
that the sign of the PAHO variable is negative. All three differences  also appear, however,
in regressions using WHO data without fixed country effects (not shown), suggesting that
-24 -this is probably not due to measurement  errors in the dependent variables.  The main
substantive findings of this paper are described below.
Finding  1: The global  policy environment signif  icantly affected immunization coverage
rates in countries at all income levels.
Figures 3 and 4 show that low-, middle-, and high-income countries all increased
their average immunization coverage from  1981  to the early 1990s, when the rate of
increase began to level off. Figure 5 shows the same phenomenon by region.  Gains were
apparent in the great majority of countries: of the 197 countries for which some DTP
vaccine coverage rate data were available, only 26 countries had final recorded rates that
were lower than their first recorded rate (22 for measles), and in 12 of those the last
recorded rate was no more than three percentage points lower than the first. It is true that
coverage rates  fell sharply in some places. For instance, coverage with the DTP vaccine in
Comoros fell from 82 percent in 1989 to 48 percent inl997, and the measles coverage rate
declined in the Republic of Congo from 49 percent in 1981  to 18 percent in 1997.  Still, the
upward trend is visible among countries at all income levels and almost all regions of the
22 world,2  and the trend effect remains significant  in the estimation equations when variables
that were also increasing over the period (national income, population, democracy,
institutional quality,  etc.) are included. Year fixed effects by themselves explain 28 percent
of the variance in DTP coverage rates in low income countries,  36 percent in middle
income countries,  and 17 percent in high income countries; and they account for 24 percent
of the variance in the logit estimates of the introduction of the hepatitis B vaccine in low-
and middle-income  countries.  The slowdown in the  1990s is understandable because the
last people immunized  are the hardest to reach, but the reason why immunization rates
among disparate countries were almost all increasing to begin with is less obvious.
22  The major exception is Eastern Europe, where average coverage rates hovered around 95 percent until
1991,  when they started to fall, reaching 87 percent in 1994, before climbing back to around 95 percent in
1996 and  1997. By contrast,  average coverage rates in countries of the former Soviet Union fluctuated from
1980 until 1994, when they began to climb.
- 25 -Figure 3: DTP3 coverage rates by income level, 1980 to 1997
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Figure 4: Measles  coverage rates by income level,  1980 to 1997
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-26-Figure 5: Immunization coverage rates by region, 1980-1997,  average of DTP and measles
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There  are at least two potential explanations.  First, it is possible the technology of
vaccine production or delivery improved,  and increased  coverage rates are the result of
simultaneous,  uncoordinated choices on the part of govermments  to provide  more
immunization at a lower cost (and, where private consumption is significant,  of individuals
to purchase more at a lower price).  The evidence, however,  does not support this
explanation.  Prices for DTP and measles vaccines actually increased sharply over the time
period in question, and while a number of important advances did occur in vaccine research
and development, none affected the heat stability of EPI vaccines,  reduced the number of
doses required, or created an altemative to injected  delivery, which are the most important
technical impediments  to their use in developing countries.23'24
23 The cost of EPI vaccines rose precisely during the period when inmuunization rates were increasing
most quickly in low-, middle-,  and high-income countries.  The cost of the DTP vaccine to UNICEF went from
$0.40 per vial in  1986 to $1.15 per vial in 1992 (20 doses per vial), while the cost of a vial of measles vaccine
went from $0.68 to $1.60 over the same period (10 doses per vial). (Foster 1993)  The per dose cost of the
measles vaccine to the U. S. Centers for Disease Control went from $3.43 in 1986 to $9.93 in 1997. The
CDC's per dose cost for DTP went from $3.01 to $14.06 over the same period, although in this case the
comparison is not exact because in 1997  the formulation included acellular pertussis.  (Historical price lists
obtained from CDC, 2001)  The reason for the increase in EPI vaccine prices are probably related to the
departure of a number of manufacturers  from the market over the past two decades, partly motivated by
liability concerns.  Several developing countries now produce EPI vaccines for their own consumption and for
export, but it is unclear whether they do so at lower cost than the few remaining producers  in industrialized
-27-The more plausible explanation  entails a coordinated international policy effort. The
WHO's Expanded Program on Immunization,  launched in 1974,  and UNICEF's Universal
Childhood Immunization Campaign (UCI), from  1985-1990,  are credited with dramatically
increasing immunization coverage rates in developing countries.  They raised the profile of
immunization in developing countries, provided technical assistance to developing country
programs, and raised substantial contributions from multilateral and bilateral donors for
vaccines, refrigerators,  vehicles, and other immunization program inputs. Dummy variables
for the pre- and post-UCI periods by themselves  account for 20 percent  and 24 percent of
the variance in DTP and measles coverage rates, respectively (of  the 24 percent and 27
percent altogether that can be attributed  to fixed year effects). What is more surprising,
however, is that the same trends are observable in high-income countries, where UNICEF
activities were not operative.  In fact, the pre- and post-UCI variables  explain 7 percent of
the variance for DTP and 21 percent for measles vaccine coverage in Westem Europe. The
United Kingdom saw its DTP and measles vaccine rates go from 44 and 52 percent,
respectively, in 1981,  to 95 percent each in 1997. This worldwide trend suggests that the
WHO and UNICEF campaigns were parts of a broader worldwide change in the
international policy environment.  Professional exchanges  and the transfer of knowledge
across countries affected immunization in countries at every income level. Understanding
how the diffusion worked, and whether patterns of communication regarding immunization
were primarily contacts among key individuals, or whether some critical mass in society
was required to expand immunization programs, requires more detailed historical research.
(Valente  1995)
The focus on policy networks and donors suggests a second reason that pace of
improvements  slowed in the 1990s (in addition to the inevitable slowdown as countries
rates approach the upper limit of 100 percent): international  donors changed their priorities.
Many reduced their support for routine immunization programs once the UCI period came
to an end and new priorities, such as polio eradication,  arose. UNICEF, for example,
reduced its immunization funding from US$182 million to US$51.4 million between 1990
and 1998, and increased the proportion of funds spent on vaccine procurement (as opposed
countries. Domestic production could conceivably create political incentives to consume  vaccines
domestically.  One promising delivery vehicle for developing country EPI programs,  not yet developed, is an
inhaleable measles  vaccine.
24Price does appear to be a significant factor in delaying the adoption of new vaccines, however, which
are several times more expensive  than EPI vaccines. (GAO  1999 pp.14-15,  Wenger 2001)  Like other agents,
governments and donors seem to take more account of the prices of goods they have not yet purchased, in this
case the newer vaccines, than price changes for goods they are already purchasing,  EPI vaccines, because the
latter have become institutionalized in public health programs and have bureaucratic  and political
constituencies.
-28-to other forms of immunization support) from 25 percent in  1990 to 80 percent in 1998
(General Accounting Office  1999).
Finding  2: Contact  with donor agencies raised  coverage rates  for EPI  vaccines, but slowed
adoption of  new vaccines.
The parameter  estimates for variables denoting membership in the PAHO and
UNICEF revolving funds are significant, positive, and large in magnitude in the cases of
measles and DTP. Other things being equal, belonging to the UNICEF fund raised a
country's  coverage rate for DTP, under 95 percent confidence  intervals, by 2.2  - 15.0
percentage points, for measles by 4.3  - 16.5 percentage points. Membership  in the PAHO
fund raised DTP coverage 6.0  - 21.3 points and measles by 7.3  - 26.6 points. Even though
most Latin American and Caribbean countries  are members of the PAHO fund, the PAHO
variable itself was the key explanatory factor: when an indicator variable for the Latin
American and Caribbean region was included in the regression above, it was found to be
insignificant while the parameter estimate on the PAHO variable remained unchanged.
In these "revolving  funds" countries repay the donor agencies for vaccines
purchased on their behalf or, in the case of some UNICEF and one or two PAHO countries,
repay them with funds obtained from another donor. Vaccine prices that manufacturers
offer UNICEF and PAHO tend to be somewhat lower than those the countries could obtain
on their own, and member countries can repay the donors in local currency,  so membership
in the funds does include pecuniary benefits. But because the materials cost of EPI vaccines
is small both in absolute terms (around $0.50-$1.00  for all doses of all six vaccines)  and
relative to overall program costs, the principal benefits of participation involve assistance  in
procurement,  quality checks on the vaccines,  and the associated technical and
programmatic assistance that the donor agencies provide. A variety of donors make other
financial contributions to the immunization programs of low- and middle-income  countries,
and it is possible that these less institutionalized,  one-off grants, donations, and loans to
countries do not have the same effect as membership in these funds. The fact that the
coefficient  on the foreign aid variable is not significant in the estimations  is consistent with
the idea that revenue assistance per se does not affect coverage  rates.
One cannot rule out the idea that the political or economic characteristics that lead a
country to join a donor fund drive up coverage rates, rather than activities of the donor
agencies per se. But this possibility is hard to square with the fact that membership  in both
funds delayed adoption of the hepatitis B vaccine.  It is hard to imagine a political
characteristic  of a country that would lead it to join a vaccine fund and compel it to delay
- 29 -the incorporation of a new vaccine. It is more likely that the donor agencies themselves
played an active role in the process. In this case, the donors had first promoted vaccination
for high-risk groups.  WEHO recommended universal vaccination for hepatitis B in 1992,
after evidence regarding its efficacy and cost-effectiveness  became available, and called for
the incorporation of it into all national immunization programs by 1997. (Hallauer  1995).
Evidence on the effectiveness  of hepatitis B from clinical trials and studies of hepatitis B
endemicity  and transmission in Chile and elsewhere  was persuasive for Latin American and
Caribbean countries (Fay 1990, Hurtado and others  1993). Cost and financing issues may
also have been relevant to donors. UNICEF and PAHO did not begin to purchase the
hepatitis B vaccine until 1993 and  1994 respectively, by which time several competing
manufacturers had begun to produce the vaccine and its price had fallen from over $30 per
dose to less than a dollar. And while UNICEF issued a formal policy in 1998, encouraging
its country-level  offices to take a leading role in introducing new vaccines  in their
countries, additional funds were not provided for this purpose. (General Accounting  Office
1999) Thus, whether for reasons of epidemiological caution, cost concerns, or an inability
to provide the necessary funds, donors seem to have slowed the adoption of hepatitis B
vaccine  in countries over which they had influence
Finding  3: Democratic  government lowered coverage rates, but this effect was not
observed at low income levels.
The parameter estimates on democratic government and on its interaction with the
logarithm of per capita GDP were significant and had relatively small standard errors,  and
were strikingly robust to a variety of specifications  in the DTP and measles models. A
typical low-income country in 1997, with a GDP per capita of $400, had a DTP coverage
rate that was, given a 95 percent confidence interval, 0.5 - 1.0 percentage points higher  for
each one point increase in its democracy score (which ranged from 0 to 10),  controlling for
time trends and other effects. To illustrate the scale of the democracy variable, the departure
of Bangladesh's  General Ershad from power in 1990 and the country's  first competitive
elections in 1991 moved that country's democracy score from 0 in  1990 to 6 in 1991.
Bangladesh's DTP coverage rate increased (a much higher than expected)  18 percentage
points between those two years.  On the other hand, a typical middle income country in
1997, with a GDP per capita of $2,850, had a DTP coverage rate that was 1.7 - 2.5
percentage points lower for each one point increase in its democracy score. Peru's
democracy score fell from 8 in 1991  to 2 in 1992 as President Fujimori closed Congress and
suspended the judiciary, and Peru's DTP coverage rate increased from 71  percent to 83
percent between those two years. The income level at which the net democracy effect turns
negative, for both measles and DTP, is $735 per capita (in constant 1995 U.S. dollars),
-30 -close to the cut-off point between low-  and lower-middle income countries in 1997. The
logit estimate for the odds of adopting hepatitis B vaccine  also had a positive, significant
coefficient for democracy score and a negative,  significant coefficient on the interaction
term with log GDP per capita;  and, strikingly,  since the model and the source of the data
were different from those  for the DTP and measles regressions, the hepatitis B estimates
had a similar income level at which the net democracy effect turned negative, $990 per
capita. (Table 2 shows odds ratios, not coefficients).
To explain  this kind of democracy effect, two things need to be accounted for: why
democratic  governments achieve lower immunization coverage rates, and why that effect is
not observed  at low income levels. There are at least three explanations for why
democracies  might provide immunization services  at relatively low rates in low-  and
middle-income countries.  First, because  democratic governments  are more responsive to the
demands of their constituents,  and because the demand for hospitals, pharmaceuticals,  and
'curative'  medical care is stronger than the demand for vaccines, democracies  might be
more likely to reallocate health resources  away from immunization and toward curative
services, especially when consumer demand for health services  increases alongside  gains in
income. A second and related reason is that the bureaucratic  elites who run public health
agencies, and who often favor vertical programs  such as immunization,  are granted more
autonomy in autocratic regimes. Bureaucratic  elites also utilize that autonomy more
effectively as national income grows. Brazil's former public health agency,  SUCAM, was
established during the military dictatorship and was organized in quasi-military  'brigades'
which, sporting uniforns and arm bands, led 'campaigns'  to bring public health services
into the Brazilian interior. Its martial organizational  structure and culture became less
attractive as Brazil democratized,  and it was eventually restructured  out of existence in
1991.  Although it cannot be attributed to any single event, it is worth pointing out that DTP
coverage  in Brazil was 67 percent and 65 percent in 1984 and 1985,  respectively,  and 58
percent and 57 percent in  1986 and 1987, the years following the regime transition.  Media
interest, which tends to be higher in democratic countries,  amplified concerns  over the side-
effects of immunization and led to declines in coverage rates in two democratic  countries  in
the 1970s, the United Kingdom and Sweden.  It is important to add the caveat that quasi-
military organization, though arguably beneficial  for EPI vaccine coverage over this time
period, could hinder other public health objectives.  For instance, the rigidity of the SUCAM
was one reason why Brazil did not promptly shift malaria control strategies after evidence
mounted that its mosquito eradication program of the  1980s was failing. More famously,
free media and public scrutiny have helped democracies  avoid famines (Sen 2000). Third,
communist regimes, which historically have almost never permitted political contestation,
might have an ideological affinity for immunization programs.  The faith in government
- 31 -control, while retarding productivity in most industries, might be valuable in activities
where public sector action is called for, such as immunization.  Vietnam,  Cuba, and China
had coverage rates over 90 percent by the early 1990s, and most of Eastern Europe had
achieved similar rates in the early 1980s. Historical coverage rates in those countries might
be somewhat exaggerated;  but high levels of immunization coverage would be consistent
with the widely acknowledged  commitment to public health service provision in the
Communist bloc.
There are two reasons why the negative relationship between democracy and
immunization might not be observed in low-income countries. First, at low-income levels
autocracy might be associated with political and societal isolation, and infornation
regarding immunization that would otherwise accompany professional exchanges,  foreign
aid, and media contact is almost entirely blocked.  Autocracy in poor countries might also be
associated with outright theft of public resources more often than with technocratic
leadership. Second, the democracy variable might be associated with trust, which is perhaps
particularly important when the political capacity to mobilize communities is weak. While
plausible, this explanation appears inconsistent with the results of the hepatitis B adoption
model, in which the democracy effect is found to have the same magnitude and sign as in
the coverage rate models, suggesting that the democracy effect operates primarily through
government decisionmaking and not by increasing social trust in government programs.
Finding  4: The quality of a country's institutions and its level of  development influence
immunization coverage rates, but several  variables related to the demandfor vaccines do
not.
Other things being equal,  each one point increase in the quality of a country's
institutions raised coverage rates by 0.6 - 1.5 percentage points (95 percent confidence
interval), and made it 18 - 52 percent more likely that a country incorporated the hepatitis
B vaccine into its immunization protocol. A 50 percent increase in the per capita income of
a typical low-income country, going form $400 to $600 per capita, would raise DTP and
measles coverage rates 1.7 - 8.0 and 3.6 - 14.8 percentage points, respectively. While the
influence of a country's institutions would operate by increasing the efficiency of the
distribution system, the effect of  national  income might work through both supply and
demand channels. Note that the effect of  joining an international revolving fund for
vaccines is larger than a 50 percent increase in national income. Instances of ethnic or
revolutionary war, or other adverse regime events and instances of genocide and politicide,
all captured in the state failure variable, were, unsurprisingly, negatively associated with
-32  -coverage rates and vaccine adoption;  but the variable was significant only for DTP
coverage,  and it lost significance when high leverage variables were dropped.
A variety of other variables thought to be related to immunization demand, most
notably the illiteracy rate, were found not to be significant. (Table I shows that illiteracy is
significantly and positively related to the measles coverage rate, but this appears to be a
spurious correlation:  deleting two outlier observations,  Cameroon in 1983 and 1984, makes
the illiteracy insignificant while leaving the coefficients  and the standard errors on the other
variables unchanged).  The penetration of modem media also was not related to coverage
rates: a measure of TVs per capita was not significant,  and the same was true in earlier
regressions that included variables  for radios and newspapers per capita. Female labor force
participation,  related to women's empowerment,  was not significant in earlier regressions
and was not included in the final model. Given the importance  attached to demand,
educational  levels,  and trust in studies of immunization outcomes at the household level,
these results might be surprising.  The interpretation offered here is that immunization
efforts at the national level between  1980 and 1997 were principally supply-side
investments. This is consistent with available studies that find that immunization programs
in the in the past two decades invested little in information, education,  and communication
activities,25 with accounts of the weakness of social mobilization and community
participation in such programs (UNICEF  1996 pp. 87-90),26 and with findings in the present
study that point to the importance of contact with donor agencies  for raising coverage rates.
Historical practice does not imply optimality, however,  and it possible that immunization
programs in developing  countries might have been more efficient and more sustainable had
there been greater emphasis on information  and education.  (Nichter 1995;  Streefland  1995;
UNICEF  1996; Levine, Rosenmoller, and Khaleghian 2001).
Finally,  it was thought that changes in disease incidence in previous years might
affect demand for vaccines in the current year, and earlier regressions  included changes in
diphtheria, pertussis,  and measles incidence between the current and the previous  current
(incidence in year t minus incidence  in year t- 1),  and changes in incidence lagged one year
(incidence in year t-I minus incidence in year t-2). Disease incidence was significant in just
one of the six resulting regressions (change in measles incidence between current and the
previous year), but the sign of the coefficient on the incidence variable was in the wrong
direction (it was negative),  and after eliminating one outlying observation it lost statistical
25 In one series of case  studies, IEC and social mobilization accounted for less than 0.8 percent of
immunization program costs in Morocco (0.15  percent), Bangladesh (0.80 percent),  Cote d'Ivoire (0.39
percent) and Ghana (0.51  percent) (Kaddar and others 2000, Levin and others 2001).
26 An extreme examnple  is  Somalia,  where army soldiers  "mobilized" mothers and generated "demand"
during immunization campaigns!  (UNICEF  1996, p.88).
- 33 -significance  at p<O.O5. The models used in this paper predict the level of immunization
coverage rates, and it possible that changes in disease incidence  are reflected not in overall
coverage rates at the national level but in changes in coverage rates, so additional
regressions (not shown) examined first differences  in coverage  as a function of first
differences in incidence, and of the latter variable lagged. Again, none of the variables for
changes in incidence was significant.  There has also been a debate in the immunization
community regarding the impact of polio eradication campaigns, in which the polio vaccine
is widely distributed,  on "routine" EPI vaccine programs. Using the change in polio
incidence over the previous year as an indirect measure of the strength of campaigns to
eradicate polio (and the same variable lagged one year), no relationship was found between
polio campaigns  and routine immunization.
Conclusions
Accounts of service delivery usually adopt a standard political economy approach.
The resources of different interest groups, combined with the institutional landscape in
which their resources are brought to bear, determine the outcomes of reform efforts. In that
framework, regimes, institutions, and other "rules of the game" determnine the objective of
political actors-votes in most models of contested democracies, power or utility in other
cases-and therefore also determine the channels through which the financial,
organizational,  and ideological resources of interest groups flow. That framework is useful
in explaining why changes in the national system of health financing might be voted down,
or why efforts to link teacher pay to performance  founder. But the framework misses the
role institutions  and regimes play in facilitating the transfer of knowledge and motivating
political and bureaucratic actors. These functions of institutions are especially important in
services  for which consumer demand and the material interests of providers are both weak,
services which, though important, operate "below the radar" of most interest groups.
Among the most important of these is the provision of basic vaccines for childhood
diseases.
The factors that most affect immunization coverage rates in low- and middle-
income countries involve broad changes in the global policy environment and contact with
international agencies. Democracies  tend to have lower coverage rates than autocracies,
perhaps because bureaucratic  elites in military governments and Leninist parties have an
affinity for immunization programs, or perhaps because they are granted more autonomy
and more resources than in democracies, although this effect is not visible in low-income
countries. The reason for these effects, and the mechanisms through which they operate,
warrant clarification in further quantitative  and qualitative research. It is more
- 34-straightforward to understand why the quality of a nation's institutions and its level of
development are related to immunization rate coverage.  The evidence presented suggests
that national coverage rates are in general more a function of supply-side than demand
effects.  There is no evidence that epidemics or polio eradication  campaigns affect
immunization  rates one way or another, or that average immunization rates increase
following outbreaks of diphtheria, pertussis, or measles.
Targeting immunization efforts on autocratic regimes is not the correct inference to
draw from this analysis.27 Rather, the findings underscore the importance of the exchange
of professional knowledge,  autonomy for public health managers, the quality of national
institutions,  and the involvement of international  agencies in raising immunization coverage
rates. The negative effect of democratic  governance  and the weakness of demand
presuppose the existing structure of immunization programs, which generally include
relatively small expenditures  on information, education,  and communication.  Larger and
more sustained efforts to motivate people to get vaccinated  could create a new dynamic in
which demand-side variables have more noticeable effects on coverage rates.
References
The word "processed"  describes informally reproduced works that may not be commonly
available through library systems.
Beck N.,  and J. N. Katz.  1995.  "What to do (and not to do) with Time-Series  Cross-Section
Data." American Political  Science Review, 89(3):  634-647.
Beck, T., G. Clarke,  A. Groff, P. Keefer, and P. Walsh. 2000. "New Tools and New Tests
in Comparative Political Economy:  The Database of Political Institutions." Policy
Research Working Paper 2283: World Bank, Development Research Group,
Washington,  D.C.
Bennett, S., A.  J. Woods, W. M. Liyanage, and D.  L Smith.  1991. "A simplified general
method for cluster-sample  surveys of health in developing  countries."  World Health
Statistics Quarterly  44: 98-106.
Bhargava, A, L. Franzini, and W. Narendranathan.  1982. "Serial Correlation and the Fixed
Effects Model." Review of  Economic Studies 49(4):  533-49.
Boerma,  H.  T., A. E.  Sommerfelt,  S. 0. Rutstein,  G. Rojas.  1990. "Immunization:  Levels,
Trends and Differentials." DHS Comparative Studies, No.  1. Columbia, MD:
Institute for Resource Development.
27 Nor is discouraging  democracy  so as to raise immunization rates  (!).
- 35 -Boerma, J. T., and G. T. Bicego.  1993.  "The Quality of Data on Child Immunization in
DHS-I Surveys."  Chapter 4, Macro International Inc.  1993: An Assessment of the
Quality of  Health Data in DHS-I Surveys. DHS Methodological Reports, No. 2.
Calverton, MD: Macro International Inc.
Bryant, J. 1998. "Communism, Poverty, and Demographic Change in North Vietnam."
Population  and  Development Review 24: 235-69.
Caldwell, J. C., P. H. Reddy, and P. Caldwell. 1983.  "The Social Component of Mortality
Decline: An Investigation in South India Employing Alternative Methodologies."
Population  Studies 37:  185-205.
Caldwell, J. C.  1986. "Routes to Low Mortality in Poor Countries." Population  and
Development Review 12(2):  171-220.
Dahl, R.  1971. Polyarchy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Demographic and Health Surveys. 1990 to 1997. Used data from DHS surveys in
Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,  Central African Republic,
Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ghana,
Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyz Republic, Malawi, Mali,
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay,
Peru, Tanzania,  Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  Calverton, MD:
Macro International Inc.
DeRoeck, D., and A. Levin. December 1998.  "Review of Financing of Immunization
Programs in Developing and Transitional Countries."  Special Initiatives Report No.
12. Bethesda, MD: Partnerships  for Health Reform Project, Abt Associates Inc.
Desai, S., and S. Alva.  1998. "Maternal  Education and Child Health:  Is there a Strong
Causal Relationship?" Demography  35(1):  71-81.
Diggle, P.J., K-Y Liang,  S. L. Zeger.  1994. Analysis ofLongitudinal  Data. Oxford
Statistical Science Series, No.  13. Oxford:  Clarendon Press
Fay, 0. H.  1990. "Hepatitis B in Latin America:  Epidemiological patterns and eradication
strategy."  Vaccine 8 (Supplement): S 100-106
Fogel, R W. 1984. "Nutrition and the Decline of Mortality since 1700:  Some Preliminary
Findings." NBER. Working Paper No.  1402. Cambridge, Mass.
Foster, S.O., editor. 1993. Immunization in 12 African Countries, 1982-93. Washington:
USAID Africa Child Survival Initiative.
Gage, A. J., E. Sommerfelt, and A. Piani.  1997. "Household Structure  and Childhood
hnmunization  in Niger and Nigeria." Demography  34(2): 295-3 09.
Gangarosa,  E. J., A. M. Galazka,  C. R. Wolfe,  L. M. Phillips, R. E. Gangarosa,  E. Miller,
and R. T. Chen. 1998. "Impact of Anti-Vaccine Movements on Pertussis Control:
The Untold Story." Lancet 351: 356-61.
- 36-General Accounting Office (GAO).  1999. "Report to Congressional Requesters:  Factors
Contributing to Low Vaccination Rates in Developing Countries."  Washington,
D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office.
Gould, W. 2001.  "What is the between estimator?" Stata Frequently  Asked Questions,
http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/xt.html.  Accessed on November  12, 2001.
Grindle, M.  S., and J. W.  Thomas.  1991. Public Choices and  Policy Change: The Political
Economy of  Reform in Developing Countries. Baltimore,  Md.: Johns Hopkins
University Press
Gwatkin, D.R.. 2000. "Health inequalities and the health of the poor." Bulletin of the World
Health Organization 78(1): 3-17.
Gwatkin,  D.R., S. Rutstein, K. Johnson,  R. P. Pande, and A. Wagstaff. May 2000. "Socio-
economic differences  in health,  nutrition and population in [44 countries]."
Washington, D.C.: Health, Nutrition and Population Department, The World Bank
Gurr, T.R., B. Harff, M. G. Marshall.  1997. "Codebook: Internal wars and failures of
governance,  1954-1996."  College Park, MD: Center for International Development
and Conflict Management,  University of Maryland
Hallauer,  J.  1995. "Viral Hepatitis Prevention Board: Summary of strategies and
recommendations."  Vaccine 13 (Supplement  1):  S61-63.
Hausdorff, W. P.  1996. "Prospects for the use of new vaccines in developing  countries:  cost
is not the only impediment."  Vaccine 14:  1179-86.
Henderson, R. H.,  and T. Sundaresan.  1982.  "Cluster sampling to assess immunization
coverage:  A review of experience with a simplified sampling method." Bulletin of
the World Health Organization  60(2): 253-60.
Hoshaw-Woodard,  S. for WHO.  2001. "Description  and comparison of the methods of
cluster sampling and lot quality assurance  sampling to assess immunization
coverage."  WHO/V&B/01.26.  Geneva: World Health Organization
Huang, K-Y, and S-R Lin. 2000. "Nationwide  vaccination:  A success  story in Taiwan."
Vaccine 18: S35-S38.
Hull, H.  F., and R. B. Aylward.  2001. "Progress towards global polio eradication."  Vaccine
19: 4378-84.
Hurtado, C., J. Brahm, J. Chesta, R. Latorre, and M. Velasco.  1993. "Hepatitis B Vaccine:
Early and late response in Chileans with high risk of infection." Revista Medica
Chilena 121(5): 503-505.
James, W.  1988. Immunization: The Reality Behind the Myth. New York: Bergin and
Garvey.
Johansson, S. R., and C. Mosk.  1987.  "Exposure, Resistance  and Life Expectancy:  Disease
and Death during the Economic Development of Japan,  1900-1960." Population
Studies 41(2): 207-35.
- 37-Justice, J. 2000a. "Study of Factors Influencing the Introduction of New and Underutilized
Vaccines in Bangladesh."  Paper prepared  for the Global Alliance for Vaccines  and
Immunization.  Processed.
. 2000b. "Study of Factors Influencing the Introduction of New and Underutilized
Vaccines in Philippines." Paper prepared for the Global Alliance for Vaccines and
hmmunization.  Processed.
. 2000c. "Study of Factors Influencing the Introduction of New and Underutilized
Vaccines in Uganda." Paper prepared  for the Global Alliance for Vaccines  and
Immunization. Processed.
Kaddar,  M., A. Levin, L. Dougherty,  and D. Maceira.  2000. "Costs and financing of
immunization programs: findings of four case studies."  Special Initiatives Report
26. Bethesda, MD: Partnerships for Health Reform Project, Abt Associates Inc.
Kennedy, Peter.  1992. A Guide to Econometrics. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press
Khaleghian, Peyvand.  June 2001. "Immunization Financing and Sustainability:  A Review
of the Literature." Special Initiatives Report No. 40. Bethesda, MD: Partnerships for
Health Reform Project, Abt Associates Inc.
Knack, Steve and IRIS Center, University of Maryland. 2000. IRIS-3 File of International
Country  Risk Guide (ICRG) Data. College Park, MD: Center for Institutional
Reform and the Infornal Sector (IRIS  Center), University of Maryland.
Knack,  S., and P. Keefer.  1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-
Country Investigation." Quarterly Journal  of Economics 112: 1251-88.
Lake, D. A., and M. A. Baum. 2001. "The Invisible Hand of Democracy:  Political Control
and the Provision of Public Services." Comparative  Political  Studies 34(6):  587-
621.
Lanata, C. F., G.  Stroh, R. E. Black, and H. Gonzales.  1990. "An evaluation of lot quality
assurance sampling to monitor and improve immunization coverage." International
Journal  of  Epidemiology 19(4): 1086-90.
Levin, A., S. England, J. Jorrisen, B. Garshong,  and J. Teprey.  2001.  "Case study on the
costs and financing of immunization services in Ghana." Bethesda,  MD:
Partnerships for Health Reform Project, Abt Associates Inc.
Levine, M. M., and 0. S.  Levine.  1997. "Influence of disease burden, public perception,
and other factors on new vaccine development,  implementation,  and continued use."
Lancet 350: 1386-92.
Levine, R.E., M. Rosenmoller, and P. Khaleghian.  2001. "Financial Sustainability of
Childhood Immunizations:  Issues and Options." GAVI discussion paper. Accessed
at http://www.vaccinealliance.org  on December 8, 2001
- 38 -Lemeshow,  S., A. G. Tserkovnyi,  J. L. Tulloch, J. E. Dowd,  S. K. Lwanga, and J.  Keja.
1985a. "A computer simulation of the EPI survey strategy." International  Journal  of
Epidemiology 14: 473-81.
Lemeshow,  S., D. Robinson.  1985b. "Surveys to measure programme coverage and impact:
a review of the methodology used by the Expanded Programme on Immunization."
World Health Statistics Quarterly  38: 65-75.
Madrid,  M. Y. 1998a.  "The Introduction  and Use of New Vaccines in the Public and
Private Sectors. Country Report: Morocco."  Paper prepared for the Global Alliance
for Vaccines  and Immunization. Processed.
. 1998b.  "The Introduction and Use of New Vaccines in the Public and Private
Sectors. Country Report: Thailand."  Paper prepared for the Global Alliance for
Vaccines  and Immunization.  Processed.
. 1998c.  "The Introduction  and Use of New Vaccines in the Public and Private
Sectors. Country Report: Zimbabwe."  Paper prepared for the Global Alliance for
Vaccines and Immunization.  Processed.
Mahoney, R. T., and J. E. Maynard.  1999. "The introduction of new vaccines into
developing countries."  Vaccine 17: 646-52.
Marshall, M.G.,  and K. Jaggers.  2000. "Polity IV Project:  Dataset Users'  Manual." College
Park, MD: University of Maryland.
McGuire, J. W. 2001.  "Democracy,  Social Policy, and Mortality Decline in Brazil."
Department of Government, Wesleyan University, Middleton,  Conn. Processed.
McKeown,  T.  1976.  The Modern Rise of Population.  London: Edward Arnold.
Miller, M.  A., and W. D. Flanders. 2000. "A model to estimate the probability of hepatitis
B and Haemophilus influenzae type B-vaccine uptake into national vaccination
programs."  Vaccine 18: 2223-30.
Munck, G. L., and J.  Verkuilen.  2000.  "Measuring Democracy:  Evaluating alternative
indices."  Paper presented at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, August 31  to September 3, 2000, Washington, D.C.
Muraskin,  W.  1995.  "Bucking the health establishment:  Alexander Milne and the fight for a
New Zealand hepatitis B immunization program." Social Science and  Medicine
41(2): 211-25.
Nair, V. M., K.  R. Thankappan, P.S. Sarma, and R. S. Vasan. 2001.  "Changing roles of
grass-roots health workers  in Kerala,  India." -Health Policy and Planning  16(2):
171-79.
Nathanson, C. A.  1996.  "Disease Prevention as Social Change: Toward a Theory of Public
Health." Population  and Development Review 22(4):  609-37.
Nichter, M.  1995. "Vaccinations  in the Third World: A Consideration  of Community
Demand." Social Science and Medicine 41(5):  617-32.
- 39-Parish, W. L., and M. K. Whyte. 1978.  Village and Family in Contemporary  China.
Chicago: University of Chicago  Press.
Pebley, A.R.,  N. Goldman,  and G. Rodriguez.  1996. "Prenatal and Delivery care and
Childhood Immunization in Guatemala: Do Family and Community Matter?"
Demography  33(2): 231-47.
Preston, S. H.  1976. Mortality  Patterns  in National  Populations.  NY: Academic Press.
PRS Group. 2000. International  Country Risk Guide. East Syracuse, NY: The PRS Group,
Inc.
Ramirez, F.O., Y. Soysal, and S. Shanahan.  1997. "The changing logic of political
citizenship:  Cross-national acquisition of women's suffrage rights,  1890 to 1990."
American Sociological Review 62(October):  735-45.
Reich, M. R.  1994. "The Political Economy of Health Transitions in the Third World." In
Lincoln C. Chen and Arthur Kleinman, Health and Social Change in International
Perspective. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
Rigau-Perez,  J. G.  1989. "The Introduction of Smallpox Vaccine in 1803  and the Adoption
of Immunization  as a Government Function in Puerto Rico." Hispanic  American
Historical  Review 69(3): 393-423.
Sandiford, P. 1993. "Lot quality assurance sampling for monitoring immunization
programmes: cost-efficient or quick and dirty?" Health Policy and Planning  8(3):
217-23.
Sen, A. 2000. Development as Freedom. NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
Sk6ld, P. 1996. "From Inoculation to Vaccination:  Smallpox in Sweden in the Eighteenth
and Nineteenth Centuries." Population  Studies 50: 247-62.
Stata Corporation.  1999. Stata Reference Manual, Version 6.0.  College Station, TX:  Stata
Press.
_  .___  2001. Stata Reference Manual, Version 7.  0. College Station,  TX: Stata Press
Steele, F., I. Diamond, and S. Amin.  1996. "Immunization Uptake in Rural Bangladesh: A
Multilevel Analysis." Journal of  the Royal Statistical  Society 159(2): 289-99.
Streatfield, K., M. Singarimbun,  and I. Diamond.  1990. "Maternal  Education and Child
Inmunization." Demography 27(3): 447-55.
Streefland,  P. H. 1995.  "Enhancing Coverage and Sustainability of Vaccination Prograrns:
An Explanatory Framework with Social Reference  to India." Social Science and
Medicine 41(5): 647-56.
Taylor,  C. E., F. Cutts, and M. E.  Taylor.  1997. "Ethical dilemmas in current planning  for
polio eradication."  American Journal  of Public Health 87(6): 922-25.
Turner, A. G., R. J. Magnani, and M. Shuaib.  1996. "A not quite as quick but much cleaner
alternative to the Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) cluster survey
design." International  Journal  of  Epidemiology 25(1):  198-203.
- 40-UNICEF.  1996.  "Sustainability of achievements:  Lessons learned from Universal Child
Immunization."  Evaluation  and Research Report, January  1996. New York, NY:
UNICEF.
Valente,  T. W.  1995. Network Models of the Diffusion of  Innovations. Cresskill, NJ:
Hampton Press.
Van Damme P. 2001. "Hepatitis  B: Vaccination  programs in Europe-an update."  Vaccine
19: 2375-79.
Van Damme,  P., M. Kane, and A. Meheus.  1997.  "Integration of hepatitis B vaccination
into national imnmunisation programmes." BMJ 314(7086):  1033-36.
Vryheid, R.E., M. A. Kane,  N. Muller,  G. C. Schatz, S. Bezabeh.  2000. "Infant and
adolescent hepatitis B immunization up to  1999: a global overview."  Vaccine 19(9-
10):  1026-37.
Wenger,  J. D., J-L Di Fabio, J. M. Landaverde, 0. S. Levine, T. Gaafar.  2000.
"Introduction of Hib conjugate vaccines  in the non-industrialized world:  experience
in four 'newly adopting'  countries."  Vaccine 18: 736-42.
Wenger J. 2001. "Vaccines  for the developing world:  current status and future directions."
Vaccine 19:  1588-91.
Weyland,  K.  1996. Democracy without Equity. Failures  of Reform in Brazil. Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press.
Widdus, R.  1999a. "Introduction  of vaccines  into the Third World."  Comptes Rendus de
l'Academie des Sciences 322:  909-1016.
Widdus, R.  1999b. "Adoption of new vaccines." Keynote address, "Expanding and
Sustaining Immunisation"  conference: Brisbane, Australia, November 1999.
Accessed at http://www.health.gov.au/pubhlth/strateg/immunis/seminar  on
December 8, 2001.
Wiggins V.  1999. "How does xtgls differ from regression clustered with robust standard
errors?" Stata Frequently  Asked Questions. Accessed at http://www.stata.coni/
support/faqs/stat/xtgls_rob.html  on November  12, 2001.
WHO.  1991. "The EPI Coverage Survey."  WHO/EPIIMLM/91.10.  Geneva: World Health
Organization.
_  .__  1995. "Expanded programme  on immunization.  Inmunization schedules in the
WHO European Region,  1995."  Weekly Epidemiologic Record 70(3 1, August 4):
221.
_.___  1996a. "Monitoring Immunization  Services Using the Lot Quality Technique."
WHO/VRO/TRAM/96.01.  Geneva: World Health Organization.
. 1996b. "Expanded programme on immunization  (EPI). Immunization schedules  in
the WHO Eastern Mediterranean  region,  1995."  Weekly Epidemiologic  Record
71(23), June 7  1996:  173-6
- 41  -1996c. "Expanded programme on immunization (EPI) immunization schedules  in
the WHO Western Pacific Region,  1995."  Weekly Epidemiologic Record 71(18),
May3  1996:  133-7
1996d. "Expanded programme on immunization (EPI). Immunization schedules in
the WHO South-East Asia region,  1995."  Weekly Epidemiologic Record 71(13),
Mar 29  1996:  100-102.
1996e. "Expanded programme on immunization (EPI). Immunization  schedules in
the WHO African region,  1995."  Weekly Epidemiologic Record 71(12), Mar 22
1996: 90-94.
1998. "Protocol for the assessment of the quality of of surveillance  and control  of
EPI diseases." WHO/EPI/GEN/93.22.  Geneva:  WHO, Expanded Programme on
Immunization.
1999. "Informal meeting on issues of immunization data and
monitoring/management  of adverse events:  Geneva,  17-20 November 1998"
WHO/V&B/99.06.  Geneva: World Health Organization.
2000.  Statistics and Graphics,Vaccine  Assessment  and Monitoring  Team. Accessed
at http://www.who.int/vaccines-surveillance/StatsAndGraphs.htm  on November 30,
2001.
World Bank. 1997.  Confronting  AIDS: Public Priorities  in a Global Epidemic. World Bank
Policy Research Report. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
2000a. World Development Indicators. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank
2000b.  World Development Report-Attacking Poverty. Washington, D.C.: The
World Bank.
2001. Classification of Economies, Development Data Group. Accessed at
http://www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/class.htm  on November 30, 2001
- 42 -Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2754  Revealed Preference  and  Abigail Barr  January 2002  T. Packard
Self-Insurance:  Can We Learn from  Truman  Packard  89078
the Self-Employed  in Chile?
WPS2755  A Framework for Regulating  Joselito Gallardo  January 2002  T.  Ishibe
Microfinance  Institutions: The  38968
Experience  in Ghana and the Philippines
WPS2756  Incomeplete  Enforcement  of Pollution  Hua Wang  January 2002  H.  Wang
Regulation: Bargaining  Power of  Nlandu Mamingi  33255
Chinese  Factories  Benoit  Laplante
Susmita  Dasgupta
WPS2757  Strengthening the Global Trade  Bernard  Hoekman  January  2002  P. Flewitt
Architecture for Development  32724
WPS2758  Inequality, the  Price of Nontradables,  Hong-Ghi  Min  January 2002  E. Hernandez
and the Real Exchange Rate: Theory  33721
and Cross-Country  Evidence
WPS2759  Product Quality,  Productive  Aart  Kraay  January 2002  R.  Bonfield
Efficiency,  and  International  Isidro  Soloaga  31248
Technology  Diffusion:  Evidence from  James Tybout
Plant-Level Panel Data
WPS2760  Bank Lending to Small Businesses  George R.  G. Clarke  January 2002  P. Sintim-Aboagye
in Latin America: Does  Bank Origin  Robert Cull  37644
Matter?  Maria Soledad Martinez Peria
Susana M. Sanchez
WPS2761  Precautionary Saving from  Different  Richard H.  Adams Jr.  January 2002  N.  Obias
Sources of Income:  Evidence from  31986
Rural Pakistan
WPS2762  The  (Positive)  Effect of  Norbert R.  Schady  January 2002  T. Gomez
Macroeconomic Crises on  the  32127
Schooling and Employment  Decisions
Of Children in a Middle-Income Country
WPS2763  Capacity Building in Economics:  Boris  Pleskovic  January 2002  B. Pleskovic
Education and  Research in Transition  Anders  Aslund  31062
Economies  William  Bader
Robert Campbell
WPS2764  What Determines  the Quality  Roumeen Islam  January 2002  R.  Islam
of  Institutions?  Claudio E. Montenegro  32628Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2765  Inequality Aversion,  Health  Adam Wagstaff  January 2002  H.  Sladovich
Inequalities, and Health Achievement  37698
WPS2766  Autonomy,  Participation, and Learning  Gunnar S. Eskeland  January 2002  H. Sladovich
in Argentine Schools: Findings and  Deon  Filmer  37698
Their Implications for Decentralization
WPS2767  Child Labor: The Role of  Income  Rajeev H. Dehejia  January 2002  A.  Bonfield
Variability and Access to Credit in a  Roberta Gatti  31248
Cross-Section of Countries
WPS2768  Trade,  Foreign  Exchange,  and Energy  Jesper Jensen  January 2002  P. Flewitt
Policies in the Islamic Republic of  David Tarr  32724
Iran: Reform  Agenda,  Economic
Implications, and  Impact on the Poor